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Agency Conflicts and Residential Mortgage Securitization:
What Does the Empirical Literature Tell Us?
Introduction
Securitization is a widely used form of financial intermediation that generally involves: (1) pooling financial assets, (2) transferring the assets to a bankruptcy-remote special purpose entity to alleviate recourse, and (3) having the arms-length entity issue securities representing claims to the cash flows of the underlying assets. Securitization is generally believed to create value for lenders and investors through improved liquidity, capital management, and asset diversification; while borrowers benefit through expanded credit availability. However, securitization also entails breaking apart the lending process into its component parts and therefore creates agency conflicts. 1 In the wake of the recent U.S. housing bust, many analysts, economists, and policymakers blamed resulting mortgage losses, in part, on the information-based agency conflicts inherent in the securitization process.
2 Specifically, lenders may have better ex ante information about loan quality than outside investors (an adverse selection problem) and/or weaker incentives to properly screen, monitor, and/or resolve securitized loans (moral hazard problems). Well before the crisis, these notions were identified in the academic literature, as , Riddiough (1997) , DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) , and DeMarzo (2005) present models of loan sales/securitization featuring adverse selection, while Pennacchi (1988) and Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) focus on moral hazard issues. 3 Importantly, securitization-related agency conflicts have long been understood by market participants who attempt to mitigate them through the use of various legal constructs (e.g., representations and warranties, pooling and servicing agreements) and counter-veiling economic incentives (e.g., functional integration, reputation-building through repeated interaction, and risk retention). Of course, any tools used to mitigate the agency problems inherent in securitization are only effective if the lender remains in business -suggesting that sufficient equity capital is crucial. 4 Taken together, it is not entirely obvious that information-based agency conflicts should have been important contributors to the U.S. mortgage crisis. This is ultimately an empirical question. In this essay, we review the recent empirical literature attempting to link U.S. residential mortgage default risk to the agency conflicts associated with securitization. We study the U.S. experience given the central role of securitization as a mortgage financing tool in that market, as well as its role in the recent financial crisis.
In terms of agency conflicts, we focus on the literature ostensibly testing for adverse selection due to originators potentially having private information about loan quality, and for possible moral hazardinduced reductions in screening intensity by loan originators. Such studies represent the bulk of related research since the onset of the housing crisis.
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Our review of recent empirical research for the U.S. home mortgage market suggests that securitization itself may not have been a problem, but rather the origination and distribution of observably riskier loans. Low documentation mortgages, for which asymmetric information problems are acute, performed especially poorly during the crisis. Securitized low documentation mortgages performed better when included in deals where security issuers were affiliated with lenders or had significant reputational capital at-stake; and investors priced the risk of low documentation loans via larger required equity tranches and/or higher security yields.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background on the structure of the U.S. residential mortgage market. Section 3 provides a critical review of the relevant empirical literature and identifies important gaps in our knowledge about the economic significance of incentive conflicts in U.S. residential mortgage securitization. Conclusions are provided in Section 4.
Background: U.S. Residential Mortgage Market
U.S. residential mortgages are unique. Virtually all of these loans fully amortize (i.e., do not require a "balloon payment") and over very long periods of time (typically 15 or 30 years). Further, the majority of U.S. residential mortgages carry fixed rates of interest for the life of the loan. Adjustable rate loans are less popular, but nonetheless also carry fixed rates for terms ranging from 2-10 years (along with periodic and lifetime caps on interest rate adjustments). The vast majority of U.S. mortgages also include a prepayment option that allows the borrower to refinance without penalty. Green and Wachter (2005) and Gerardi, Rosen, and Willen (2010) , among others, provide discussions of the historical evolution of the U.S. residential mortgage market.
U.S. residential mortgages are largely originated by depository institutions (commercial banks, savings institutions, or credit unions) or non-bank financial institutions ("mortgage banks"). 6 Given their access to federally insured deposits, depository institutions have a significant funding advantage relative to mortgage banks. This implies that depository institutions subsequently choose whether to hold mortgages on-balance sheet or sell them into the secondary market. 7 Mortgage banks, by contrast, finance virtually all of their loan production by selling loans in the secondary market. The U.S. secondary mortgage market itself is segmented into three parts based on borrower and loan characteristics:
government, conventional-conforming, and conventional non-conforming.
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The "government market" refers to loans carrying mortgage insurance provided by either the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), Veteran's Administration (VA), or Rural Housing Service (RHS), which are generally targeted toward households with very low down-payments and/or weak credit.
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Virtually all government-insured mortgages are subsequently securitized by lenders through the Government National Mortgage Association ("Ginnie Mae"), which is an agency within the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) created for this sole purpose. In this case, approved lenders issue the Ginnie Mae mortgage-backed securities (MBS), which carry an explicit U.S.
government guarantee of the timely payment of all principal and interest. In exchange, approved lenders pay an insurance premium (known as a "guarantee fee") to Ginnie Mae.
Conventional-conforming mortgages are those eligible to be purchased or securitized by either the Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae") or the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac"). These two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) were each created by Acts of Congress to fulfill a public mission: to enhance the liquidity and stability of the US secondary mortgage market and thereby promote access to mortgage credit, particularly among low-and moderate-income households and neighborhoods. The GSEs' federal charters provide important competitive advantages that, taken together, implied US taxpayer support of their financial obligations. 10 This implicit guarantee became much stronger when the two institutions were placed into federal conservatorship in 2008 and subsequently received almost $188 billion from the U.S. Treasury.
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The term "conforming" generally relates to: (1) legal limitations on eligible mortgage size (i.e., the "conforming loan limit"); and (2) 11 See Frame, Fuster, Tracy, and Vickery (2015) for a detailed discussion of the GSEs' failure and related government takeover of the two institutions.
12 The conforming loan limit is linked to an index of housing prices and adjusted annually by the U.S. Federal Housing Finance Agency. The conforming loan limit has actually been constant since 2006; but legislation in 2009 raised the limit in certain parts of the country with higher housing prices. In 2015, the conforming loan limit was $417,000 in most of the U.S. but could be as high as $625,500 in certain high-price areas. See U.S. Federal Housing Finance Agency (2015 ,  Table 24 ) for a time series of the conforming loan limits. 13 Investors have nevertheless been historically concerned about adverse selection with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac MBS along the prepayment dimension. Specifically, before being placed into federal conservatorship, the two GSEs were the largest investors in Agency MBS and could have potentially leveraged an existing informational advantage generated from their securitization business. See Downing, Jaffee, and Wallace (2009) for a discussion and related empirical analysis.
conventional-conforming market should naturally allow the three securitizers to more aggressively enforce contracting provisions (including rescinding access to the programs).
The conventional non-conforming (i.e., private) residential mortgage market was historically composed (almost exclusively) of loans that simply exceeded the conforming loan limit -referred to as "jumbo mortgages". Given the absence of government guarantees in the secondary market, many jumbo mortgages were held by depository institutions. However, when securitized, the structure was generally like that of other consumer credit products: Lenders would typically work with an investment bank to create a set of securities backed by a loan pool --with security cash flows structured and prioritized for different investor classes. 14 Besides the simple priority of claims, additional "credit enhancements" for privately issued asset-backed securities were also used, such as: over-collateralization of the asset pool in an effort to create an equity layer to protect investors; and/or the creation of a reserve account to accrue "excess spread"
between the amounts that the mortgage borrowers pay and the amounts that investors receive (net of expenses) -again as a loss absorbing buffer. Negative equity is considered to be a necessary condition for mortgage default; although a second trigger, such as a shock to the borrower's monthly income or expenses, is also generally required as a sufficient condition. 17 The rapid decline in home prices and wave of mortgage defaults decimated the private mortgage securitization market in 2007 -a state from which it has not recovered. As discussed above, these securities were backed by very risky mortgages in terms of standard underwriting criteria (e.g., loanto-value ratios and credit scores). What was clearly under-appreciated by most market participants (borrowers, lenders, securitizers, investors, and regulators) was the probability of such a swift and severe house price decline.
18 Table 1 Given the rapid growth and subsequent massive losses in the private residential mortgage securitization market, many have speculated that securitization itself was to blame. The securitization process does involve parsing many traditional lending functions and hence creates agency conflicts.
However, these conflicts have long been understood by market participants who attempt to mitigate them through the use of various legal and economic constructs. Moreover, U.S. house prices fell almost over 27 percent in 5 ½ years on a national basis -a very unlikely event that wiped-out the equity of nearly one-quarter of all U.S. mortgages. So, taken together, it is not clear that securitization itself was a problem. Let us now review the related empirical evidence.
Empirical Literature Review
As described above, while securitization can enhance the efficiency of financial intermediation, it does create additional informational frictions that result in incentive conflicts. However, such conflicts have long been understood by market participants and various contracting devises are used to better align interests. Hence, it is unclear whether securitization-related incentive conflicts should have an economically meaningful relation with loan performance and security payoffs after controlling for observable borrower, loan, and security issue characteristics as well as macroeconomic trends.
In the wake of the U.S. housing crisis, research has examined related questions. First, are observably riskier mortgages more likely to be securitized? Second, does the secondary mortgage market suffer from adverse selection insofar as securitized mortgages more likely to default even after controlling second liens). The authors find that loans with little equity (i.e., high combined loan-to-value ratio) or weak credit scores were less likely to be securitized -consistent with lenders retaining riskier mortgages.
However, certain loan types (e.g., option ARMs; low documentation; stated income) and loan features (e.g., prepayment penalties) associated with riskier lending are found to be positively related to the probability of loan sale. Krainer and Laderman (2014) examine the determinants of securitization for conventional first lien California mortgages originated between 2000 and 2007 using the LPS Applied Analytics data. The authors estimate a multinomial logit model for (private and GSE) securitization relative to portfolio loans -pooling together all types and sizes of mortgages as well as some measures of bank performance and recent house price trends. They find that while privately securitized mortgages had higher credit scores, such loans also had higher loan-to-value ratios and were more likely to have limited documentation and be classified as "subprime" in the data. Loans securitized by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac tended to have higher credit scores, lower loan-to-value ratios, more documentation, and were less likely to be classified as subprime. Taken together, these results suggest that privately securitized California mortgages were generally riskier than portfolio loans, but that the opposite was true for mortgages presented to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Perhaps the most comprehensive analysis of this sort was conducted by Agarwal, Chang, and Yavas (2012) . These authors use the LPS Applied Analytics data pooled annually for 2004-2007 and delineate between "prime-like" and "subprime-like" mortgages and study the probability of securitization annually using a two-step competing risks methodology. The first step involves estimating default and prepayment hazards for each annual cohort using two years of performance data from an "estimation sample", which is then used to construct two-year default and prepayment probabilities for a "holdout sample". The second step relates whether a loan is securitized to the two-year probabilities and financial market conditions. The authors find that securitization of "prime-like" loans is generally negatively related to the two-year probability of default -both when securitizing with the GSEs or the private market. One exception is in 2007 when this relationship is positive for the GSE market -consistent with those institutions taking on more risk as the market turned. Results for "subprime-like" loans are mixed and generally weak.
Overall, it seems that lenders tend to transfer safer mortgages to the GSEs, but that the relation between loan risk and securitization is mixed for subprime mortgages. In any event, these borrower and loan characteristics were observable -suggesting that investors were comfortable with the attendant risks. Put another way, these studies do little to inform whether agency conflicts plague securitization, since adverse selection and moral hazard are theories which rely on the presence of private (unobservable) information.
B. Are Securitized Loans More Likely to Default After Controlling for Observable Risk Factors?
Another strand of the literature focuses on the ex post performance of securitized mortgages relative to those held in depository institution portfolios. Specifically, these studies estimate mortgage default regressions with an indicator for whether a loan was securitized and holding a large number of observable risk factors constant. The idea is to measure a "treatment effect" of securitization, which may be interpreted as reflecting unobserved private information about loan quality or underwriting effort. The authors find that, after controlling for borrower and loan characteristics, sold mortgages perform better than those held on balance sheet, although the effect goes away once "early payment defaults" are dropped. (This provides some support for market discipline as loan seasoning, or performance for some initial period, was often a pre-condition of private securitization.) Finally, the authors find that nonstandard mortgage products and loans with greater informational opacity (low documentation, brokeroriginated) defaulted at a significantly higher rate. Krainer and Laderman (2014) estimate default hazard models separately for adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) and fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) using their sample of conventional California loans from the LPS data. The authors find that securitized FRMs (both private and GSE) default at a lower rate than similar portfolio loans after controlling for some observable risk factors. For the ARM sample, GSE securitized mortgages again performed better than similar portfolio loans, although privately securitized mortgages fared worse. These authors also report that, among ARMs, non-standard mortgage products and low documentation loans defaulted at a significantly higher rate.
Elul (2015) among the two types of subprime loans, privately securitized mortgages actually perform better than other loans. However, this effect is found to be driven exclusively by loans defaulting during the first six months staying with originators -a result consistent with Jiang, Nelson, and Vytlacil (2013) . The author also generally finds that low documentation, third-party originations, and non-standard product features generally default at a significantly higher rate.
In a related study, Purnanandum (2010) the results indicate that securitization-intensive banks became more lax in their screening or whether they were simply making more observably risky loans. While the paper attempts to control for borrower credit risk (using average bank-level mortgage characteristics from HMDA) -critical pieces of information (e.g., credit scores, loan-to-value ratios, and product types) are unavailable.
Taken together, these papers provide some mixed results in terms of the overall association between mortgage default and private securitization. Interestingly, both Jiang, Nelson, and Vytlacil (2013) and Elul (2015) find that securitized subprime mortgages performed about as well as similar portfolio loans due to investor-required seasoning --one important way to combat private information about loan quality. The literature also finds that non-standard loan products, low documentation, and third-party originations performed worse than otherwise similar loans (irrespective of securitization). Such findings may reflect borrower selection into products and/or private information on the part of borrowers, brokers, or lenders.
Future research should analyze individual product categories, as it is well understood that borrower risk sensitivities (as reflected in reduced-form parameter estimates) can vary considerably. An analysis of interactions between securitization treatment and product characteristics also seems important -especially for characteristics associated with greater asymmetric information (e.g., low documentation loans and those originated by third parties). Furthermore, outside of Elul (2015), none of the papers control for the current loan-to-value on the mortgaged properties using local house price indices. This is a critical omission since a ratio above one is a necessary condition for mortgage default. 20 Finally, these very large mortgage samples tend to have material covariate imbalance across sub-groups; hence researchers should consider using matched samples to better identify the treatment effect of securitization.
C. Does Securitization Affect Lender Screening Incentives Due to Moral Hazard?
20 Virtually all mortgage data is further limited by the fact that second liens are generally unrecorded.
Several studies have argued that the secondary mortgage market established credit score cut-off points -particularly a FICO score of 620 --that may have affected lender screening incentives and the likelihood of securitization, with consequences for mortgage performance. Research documents this "cut off" through published guidance issued by Freddie Mac for its securitization program in the early 2000s.
A key issue in this segment of the literature is whether this guidance actually induced lessened or heightened screening of marginal loans. Related empirical tests employ a regression discontinuity framework applied to mortgages to borrowers with FICO scores just above and below the credit score cutoff.
In the original paper, Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2010) studied a sample of securitized, subprime, low documentation, home purchase loans originated between 2001 and 2006 from the CoreLogic database. The authors find that there were twice as many of these mortgages originated just above the FICO=620 credit score cut-off; but that these loans defaulted at a significantly higher rate. The paper interprets this as evidence of lax screening on the part of lenders. Two important weaknesses of this paper are: (1) that it only analyzes securitized loans and hence cannot test a central tenant of the hypothesis (i.e., the credit score cut-off affected the probability of mortgage securitization); (2) the limited sample (i.e., subprime, securitized, low documentation, home purchase mortgages).
These issues are addressed in subsequent work by Keys, Seru, and Vig (2012) using the LPS data for the same 2001 to 2006 period for conventional, owner-occupied, home purchase loans. The authors find that there is indeed a discontinuity in the securitization rate and securitization timeline at FICO=620, albeit only for low documentation loans aimed at the private (non-Agency) securitization market. (The paper delineates mortgages aimed at the Agency versus non-Agency markets are estimated using a propensity scoring approach.) They also find that for low documentation mortgages intended for nonAgency securitization, the delinquency rate is much lower just below the credit score cut-off (as with their previous paper). The authors find no differences in securitization rates or default rates for mortgages aimed at the Agency market (irrespective of documentation status) or full documentation loans aimed at the non-Agency market. Bubb and Kauffman (2014) reexamine the results and interpretation provided in the prior two papers. The authors propose an "origination rule-of-thumb" theory (and refer to the interpretation above as a "securitization rule of thumb" theory) which posits that the Freddie Mac guidance pertaining to mortgages with credit scores below 620 actually induces greater lender screening. The paper also critiques the earlier literature's special focus on low documentation loans because doing so implies selecting on outcome of interest -lender screening. Empirical analysis is conducted using mortgage originations present in the LPS data between 2003 and 2007. For the full sample of loans, the authors confirm large discontinuities in both the number of loans and the default rate at both FICO=620 and FICO=660, but find no material changes in securitization rates. The authors also compare examine the number and default rate of mortgage sub-groups (Agency securitized, non-Agency securitized, and portfolio loans) -finding discontinuities in loan volumes and default rates at FICO=620 for each category, although it is most striking for portfolio loans. This undercuts the notion that lender screening of subprime mortgages declined as a result of securitization.
The take-away from this strand of literature is that securitization itself is unlikely to have resulted in lax screening beyond that implied by the existence of low documentation mortgages.
D. Do MBS Investors Price Heightened Asymmetric Information and Agency Conflicts?
At the outset, we noted that the agency conflicts associated with securitization have long been understood by market participants and that various legal constructs and counter-veiling economic incentives are used to mitigate informational costs. Below, we review three recent empirical studies examining whether investors in the private mortgage securitization market priced the risk associated with low documentation loans.
Demiroglu and James (2012) study privately issued Alt-A mortgage-backed securities issued between 2003 and 2007 using data from ABSNet coupled with hand-collected information from offering prospectuses. (The focus on Alt-A deals is driven by the fact that these have a disproportionate share of "low documentation" loans in them, which are those with arguably the most private information.) The authors find that the ex post performance of deals (cumulative loss rate and foreclosure rate) was better for those where the lender was affiliated with either the securitizer/sponsor or servicer. However, this effect is driven by the one-half of sample deals with the largest fraction of low-documentation loans ("low doc deals"). Consistent with these findings, the paper also reports results showing that affiliated deals have lower yields and subordination for the AAA-rated securities, but again only for the low documentation deals.
Begley and Purnanandum (2012) study private-label residential mortgage-backed securities using information from U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filings, coupled with loan-level data from CoreLogic, for 2001 CoreLogic, for , 2002 CoreLogic, for , and 2005 . They find that, after controlling for observable borrower and loan characteristics, loan pools with a higher proportion of low documentation mortgages require larger equity tranches to absorb losses. This is consistent with investors understanding the greater potential for private information and adverse selection with low documentations loans. The paper also finds that observable risk characteristics (e.g, credit scores and loan-to-value ratios) have no effect on the size of the equity tranche, but do explain the size of the AAA-rated tranches (relative to mezzanine and equity tranches).
The authors also study the relation between the size of the equity tranche and unexpected performance of the deal (i.e., foreclosure rate after controlling for observable risk factors and macro outcomes) and find a positive relation. Adelino, Frame, and Gerardi (2014) examine subprime mortgage-backed security deals in which Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac participated as an investor (by exploiting the conforming loan limit for identification) and using the CoreLogic data for deals issued during [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . The authors find that pools bought by the GSEs had similar ex ante risk characteristics but performed significantly better ex post --relative to other mortgage pools in the same deals (after controlling for deal-level fixed effects). These findings are concentrated in low documentation loans; and for security issuers that were highly dependent on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and where originator and sponsor were affiliated. Because
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac financed about 30 percent of all securitized subprime mortgage debt, the authors argue that their findings are consistent with market discipline imposed by large investors.
The results for each of these papers are concentrated among low documentation mortgages that have the greatest potential for private information. Key findings are that: (1) The proportion of low documentation mortgages in a deal was positively correlated with the size of the equity tranche; (2) Low documentation loans tended to perform better when the lender is affiliated with the sponsor and/or servicer and this is priced into the securities; and (3) Low documentation loans performed better when purchased by Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac -particularly in cases where the issuer was historically dependent on the GSEs for placement and where the originator and sponsor were affiliated. Hence it appears that investors were wary of private information embedded in low documentation mortgages backing privately issued MBS, but that agency cost-reducing mechanisms on the issuer-side reduced these concerns and were compensated.
Conclusions
This paper reviewed recent empirical research for the U.S. home mortgage market that suggests that securitization itself may not have been a problem, but rather the origination and distribution of observably riskier loans. Low documentation mortgages, for which asymmetric information problems are acute, performed especially poorly during the crisis. Securitized low documentation mortgages performed better when included in deals where security issuers were affiliated with lenders or had significant reputational capital at-stake; and investors priced the risk of low documentation loans via larger required equity tranches and/or higher security yields.
The findings and interpretation of this literature are important for public policy. It is widely believed by policymakers and pundits that securitization itself is problematic; and this has resulted in an international consensus that lenders or securitizers retain risk as part of securitization deals. (But as shown by Willen (2014) , the largest financial intermediaries of U.S. mortgage credit risk during the recent housing boom arguably retained too much of this exposure.) To better inform policy going forward, additional research is needed to understand more completely whether certain specific contracting frictions, market practices, and/or mortgage products were central to the collapse of the U.S. private mortgage securitization market.
